Ratification of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement on Investment

Overview

The Indonesian Government signed the Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (“Agreement”), in Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 August 2009. Indonesia, on 30 August 2010, ratified the Agreement through the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 57 of 2010 on the Ratification of the Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (“Decree”). Consequently, the Agreement came into force on 30 September 2010 pursuant to Article 27 (3) of the Agreement. It is of note that under Article 2 of the Decree the English text of the Agreement takes precedence over the Indonesian version in the event of any differences in interpretation.

It is also of note that although, pursuant to Article 10 of Law No. 24 of 2000 on International Agreements, an international agreement should be ratified with the issuance of a law, the ratification of the Agreement was done via a Presidential Decree.

The Agreement is a continuance of the initial Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (“Framework Agreement”) that was signed in Phnom Penh – Cambodia, in November 2002, that set out a broad vision of what the parties to the Agreement aimed to achieve in the following 10 years in terms of establishing an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area.

Since the Framework Agreement, there has been a series of more specific agreements concerning: Protocols to Amend the Framework Agreement that was signed in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2003; a Framework Agreement on Trade in Goods and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, that were both signed in Vientiane, Laos, in November 2004; and a Framework Agreement on Trade in Services that was signed in Cebu, Philippines, in January 2007.

This edition of the Indonesian Law Digest will highlight the key features of the Agreement and provide analysis of the Agreement’s provisions.

 

Purpose

The establishment of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area covers more than eliminating barriers and quotas for trade in goods and services, it also covers investments between parties to the Agreement, which is the reason why the cooperation between the ASEAN countries and China is referred to, in Article 1 of the Framework Agreement, as comprehensive economic cooperation and not merely as free trade cooperation.

The main goal behind the Agreement, according to Article 2, is to create a better and a more conducive investment climate between the ASEAN countries and China, by means of promoting investment and creating a liberal, facilitative, transparent, and competitive investment regime. The Agreement binds the parties to protect the investments made by their counterparts in their territory, while still retaining control over their domestic laws, regulations, policy and public order. However, in exercising this control the parties should bear in mind the importance of creating a favorable investment environment that promotes the flow of investment and its protection in a party’s territory.

Though the scope of the Agreement’s application covers every type of investment, including investments made prior to the signing of the agreement, Article 3 (2) and (4) contain several exceptions to its applicability. The notable carve-outs are: tax measures, obligations, and rights that are imposed under the WTO Agreement, and tax measures under conventions regarding avoidance of double taxation. As such the numerous double taxation conventions that Indonesia has signed with other countries will not be affected by the Agreement. Additionally, regulations regarding government procurement of goods and services are also exempt from the application of the Agreement, with the condition that such procurement is exclusively for government purposes, and not with a view to commercial resale. Finally, since many have feared that the implementation of investment cooperation between ASEAN and China would hurt a number of Indonesian industries due to their inability to effectively compete due to financial limitations, technology and other reasons, Article 3 (4) (c) states that subsidies and grants that are offered exclusively to Indonesian investors, such as those in the agriculture industry, would still be allowed.

 

National Treatment and the Most Favored Nation Clause

As set out under Articles 4 and 5 on National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN), these two cornerstone principles of trade law are incorporated into the Agreement. Under these principles, parties to the Agreement are to treat other parties’ investments in their territory no less favorably than those of domestic investors or of any other party or third country. The obligations apply to treatment with respect to admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, maintenance, use, liquidation, sale, and other forms of disposal of investments. However, under Articles 4 (2) and (3) certain exceptions to the most favored nation clause are set out, carving out certain future (but allowing for an equal opportunity to negotiate equivalent) and existing agreements that provide preferential treatment.

An example of the type of abuse that the Most Favored Nation clause is designed to prevent is the case of the Indonesian National Car Program which began in 1996 with the Timor car brand that was merely a rebranding of South Korean manufactured KIAs. The effect was that the rebranded cars from South Korea benefited from not being subject to the same import duties as those from other countries. As a result Japan filed a complaint against Indonesia with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Following which it was found that such preferential treatment was in violation of the TRIMs Agreement and the 1994 GATT. With regard to the case, many observers argued that the National Car Program lacked the component of local parts, and the local participation in manufacturing of the car involved less than 30 Indonesian workers for thousands of cars that were produced. It was found that the car production was done entirely in South Korea with a completely build-up car being imported into Indonesia.

National Treatment and Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment philosophy is that of non-discrimination, nonetheless exemptions are made for preferential treatment made by parties to the Agreement for investments by third parties under bilateral, regional or international agreements. An example being the cooperation agreements between ASEAN nations, ASEAN and Korea and Japan, and an ASEAN member with countries outside ASEAN.

 

Treatment of Investments

Legal

Pursuant to Article 7, each party must ensure that investments of another party receive fair and equitable treatment and are not denied justice in any legal or administrative proceedings. This is a notable aspect of the Agreement since foreign investment has received differential treatment in Indonesia on a number of occasions, such as in Pertamina v. Karaha Bodas Company (KBC).

The case of Pertamina v. KBC was a dispute over a geothermal power project in Garut, West Java, in which Pertamina had breached its contract, leading KBC to pursue arbitration in Geneva, Switzerland, which resulted in a ruling that Pertamina had to pay 260 million US Dollars to KBC. However, the Central Jakarta District Court refused to enforce the Swiss arbitral award, even though Indonesia had ratified the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).

Expropriation of a party investment pursuant to Article 8 is possible, but such expropriation, or acts similar to expropriation, are restricted to acts done for a public purpose, in accordance with the prevailing legal procedures, and carried out in a non-discriminatory manner. Any expropriation action has to compensate the investor with the fair market value, determined at the time of expropriation, paid within a reasonable time, with any delays being subject to interest.

Since such acts of expropriation can be construed as a private international law issue, the principle of lex rei sitae is reemphasized under Article 8 (4) in relation to land. This is particularly relevant to Indonesia, where zoning changes occur on a regular basis, and may well affect an investor’s immovable assets that are located in an area that is rezoned. Also, as provided under Article 8 (6), certain expropriation of intangible investment in the form of intellectual property rights is exempted from the application of the Agreement’s provisions on expropriation.

 

Security

Many investors are concerned about security issues when considering investments in other countries, especially if the destination of the investment is a developing country. As such, uncertainty over the return of investment hinders investment flows to a number of countries, which is the case for many ASEAN members. Over the decade since the end of the Soeharto presidency, Indonesia has faced major security issues which shook the confidence of foreign investors in Indonesia and the flow of investment to Indonesia, with instances of riots, terrorism, and demonstrations on an unprecedented scale.

Regarding security issues, parties are obliged to give full protection and security assurance to other parties’ investments from any security threats that might disturb the investment. In the event that a party’s failure to secure another party’ investment results in a loss, under Article 9, the host country is obliged to provide restitution, indemnification, compensation, or another form of settlement. Although potentially appearing excessive, such provisions are in fact considered to be necessary since the success of an economy depends of the political and security stability, which in turn attracts investment.

 

Transfers and Repatriation of Profits

The free movement of capital to and from a country is common in the global economy, nonetheless in newly emerging economies, most governments want foreign investment to remain and circulate within their territory. This is often achieved by preventing and delaying capital transfers through the issuance of restrictive legislation. However, such measures to prohibit transfers of capital and the repatriation of profits from a jurisdiction are typically seen to hinder foreign investment. As a result Article 10 allows for the mostly-unrestricted movement of capital.

Under Article 10 (3) parties are given the right to prevent or delay transfers through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of their laws in the event of: bankruptcy; non-fulfillment of transfer requirements relating to securities, futures, options or derivates; non-fulfillment of tax obligations; criminal offences which require the recovery of the proceeds of crime; social security, public retirement or compulsory saving schemes; compliance with judgments in judicial or administrative proceedings; worker retrenchment benefits; and financial reporting which relates to law enforcement or financial regulatory authorities. Such restrictions on the movement of capital are typically seen as being reasonable since they are designed to prevent foreign investors from fleeing a country while leaving unsettled obligations that the local government is left to resolve.

 

Financial Safeguards

Significant economic turmoil had occurred during the past decade, including such events as the Asian monetary crisis in 1997 and the recent American and European financial crisis. As a result, under Article 11, parties are given the right to pursue financial measures to protect their monetary security. Additionally, under Article 10 (5) (c), parties are allowed to prevent or delay capital transfers if such capital movements would cause, or threaten to cause, serious economic or financial disturbance to the party.

 

Subrogation

Under Article 12 parties are given the right to step into the shoes of their investors when pursuing indemnity from other parties to the Agreement for reasons such as expropriation, as set out in Article 8, and compensation for losses caused by security issues such as wars, conflicts, state emergencies, revolts, insurrections or riots within the territory of the other party, as set out in Article 9.

The parties are deemed to acknowledge the subrogation from a party’s investor to an entity that can take the form of an agency, institution, statutory body or corporation designated for the purpose of the subrogation. It should be noted that claims brought to a party by subrogation are not entitled to receive an indemnity of more than the amount of the actual damages/losses. This is an indication that the influence of the civil law legal system prevails over that of the common law legal system, since punitive damages will not be awarded, making it impossible to recover beyond the amount of the actual loss.

 

Dispute Settlement

The Agreement regulates disputes of two types, the first one being disputes between parties, as addressed in Article 13, and the latter one being disputes between a party and an investor from another party, as addressed in Article 14. In resolving disputes between parties, the procedure does not refer to the Agreement, instead directing the parties to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism Framework Agreement that was signed in 2004 in Vientiane, Laos.

Disputes between a party and an investor from another party, under Article 14, can stem from the breach of obligations with regards to National Treatment (Article 4), Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 5), Fair and Equitable Treatment (Article 7), Expropriation (Article 8), Compensation for Losses (Article 9), and Transfers and Repatriation of Profits (Article 10), which cause loss or damage to the investor in relation to its investment with respect to the management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition of an investment.

The application of Article 14 does not apply retroactively, as its applicability is limited to investment disputes arising out of events that occurred following the entry into force of the Agreement.

A timeline to resolve investment dispute is given, under which all disputes must undergo a consultation phase. And if, within a 6 months period from a written request for consultation, the dispute has not been resolved the claimant has a choice of venue to pursue the dispute.

The venue can be in the form of an administrative tribunal of the disputing party or any administrative tribunal that has jurisdiction. An example of the latter option would be the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), using the ICSID dispute procedural law. Or the use of arbitration under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, or, if the disputing parties agree, almost any other arbitration institution using its own arbitration rules.

In the event that an investment dispute case has already been submitted to a competent domestic court, the claimant (investor) may instead submit its claim for international dispute settlement, with the requirement that before withdrawing the claim the case has not reached a final judgment. However, in the event that a dispute is initially submitted to a domestic court in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, or Vietnam, the choice of the corresponding procedural law becomes final, as per Article 14 (5).

Diplomatic protection of a disputing investor or bringing an international claim are prohibited under Article 14 (8), unless the losing party fails to abide by, and comply with, an award rendered in a dispute.

In regards to a dispute claim by an investor over a party breaching Article 8 regarding expropriation via an adoption or enforcement of a taxation measure, the party of the investor and the host party have to, upon the request of the host party, hold a consultation to determine whether the taxation measure in question has an effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalization. If within 180 days from the submission of a written request for consultation the dispute is not resolved, the disputing investor may bring its claim to arbitration.

 

Denial of Benefits

Article 15 is an anti-abuse mechanism. Designed to prevent non-party investors from trying to benefit from the Agreement, while having no real business connection in a party’s territory, by establishing a dummy corporation in a party’s jurisdiction for the purpose of benefiting from the Agreement in the territory of another party (Article 15 (1) (a)). Another ground to deny benefits is where domestic investors attempt to benefit from the Agreement by means of a similarly-designed scheme (Article 15 (1) (b)).

 

Exceptions

Under Article 16, without taking actions that might constitute or lead to unjustifiable discrimination against another party’s investors, the parties may enforce measures necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order, protect human, animal or plant life or health, or secure compliance with laws that are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement. As stated in Article 17, parties are also not to construe the Agreement in a way that might prevent them from addressing certain enumerated security issues.

 

Other Aspects

Transparency

A common issue in developing countries is that of transparency of the prevailing laws and regulations, consequently, Article 19 requires parties to make all relevant laws, regulations, policies and administrative guidelines of general application that pertain to, or affect investments in its territory publically available. And notify, at least annually, the other parties of such legislative developments. Additionally a mechanism has to be established to direct investors to where they may obtain such information.

However, not all information is to be provided to other parties, as an exception is carved out for information that would impede law enforcement, or the release of which would be contrary to the public interest.

 

Promotion and Facilitation

The comprehensive economic cooperation is to be promoted by the parties, under Article 20, by means of the parties organizing business events to raise awareness of ASEAN-China as an investment area. The parties are also obliged to facilitate investment by means of creating the necessary environment for all forms of investment; simplifying procedures for investment applications and approvals; promoting dissemination of investment information, including investment rules, regulations, policies and procedures; and establishing a one-stop investment centre in the respective host parties to provide assistance and advisory services, including the facilitation of operating licenses and permits.

 

Institution

In ensuring the implementation of the Agreement, the ASEAN Secretariat is placed in charge of monitoring and reporting the performance duties of each of the parties to the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials Meetings and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China.

 

Conclusion

The Agreement aims to facilitate the flow of Investment amongst the parties, while ensuring that investment will go side by side with the trade in goods and services, which is the aim of the comprehensive economic cooperation between ASEAN and China. In ensuring the implementation of the Agreement, parties create security and legal certainty, setting out tasks for all parties to implement the necessary legislation and to uphold the laws, which in turn should promote and protect investment within their territory.

While not every provision applies to all of the parties, due to the country specific exceptions that exist throughout the Agreement, the Agreement creates a reasonably uniform and beneficial for investment legal framework that is now being implemented within each party’s domestic law.

......

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Overview

The Indonesian Government signed the Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (“Agreement”), in Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 August 2009. Indonesia, on 30 August 2010, ratified the Agreement through the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 57 of 2010 on the Ratification of the Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (“Decree”). Consequently, the Agreement came into force on 30 September 2010 pursuant to Article 27 (3) of the Agreement. It is of note that under Article 2 of the Decree the English text of the Agreement takes precedence over the Indonesian version in the event of any differences in interpretation.

It is also of note that although, pursuant to Article 10 of Law No. 24 of 2000 on International Agreements, an international agreement should be ratified with the issuance of a law, the ratification of the Agreement was done via a Presidential Decree.

The Agreement is a continuance of the initial Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (“Framework Agreement”) that was signed in Phnom Penh – Cambodia, in November 2002, that set out a broad vision of what the parties to the Agreement aimed to achieve in the following 10 years in terms of establishing an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area.

Since the Framework Agreement, there has been a series of more specific agreements concerning: Protocols to Amend the Framework Agreement that was signed in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2003; a Framework Agreement on Trade in Goods and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, that were both signed in Vientiane, Laos, in November 2004; and a Framework Agreement on Trade in Services that was signed in Cebu, Philippines, in January 2007.

This edition of the Indonesian Law Digest will highlight the key features of the Agreement and provide analysis of the Agreement’s provisions.

 

Purpose

The establishment of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area covers more than eliminating barriers and quotas for trade in goods and services, it also covers investments between parties to the Agreement, which is the reason why the cooperation between the ASEAN countries and China is referred to, in Article 1 of the Framework Agreement, as comprehensive economic cooperation and not merely as free trade cooperation.

The main goal behind the Agreement, according to Article 2, is to create a better and a more conducive investment climate between the ASEAN countries and China, by means of promoting investment and creating a liberal, facilitative, transparent, and competitive investment regime. The Agreement binds the parties to protect the investments made by their counterparts in their territory, while still retaining control over their domestic laws, regulations, policy and public order. However, in exercising this control the parties should bear in mind the importance of creating a favorable investment environment that promotes the flow of investment and its protection in a party’s territory.

Though the scope of the Agreement’s application covers every type of investment, including investments made prior to the signing of the agreement, Article 3 (2) and (4) contain several exceptions to its applicability. The notable carve-outs are: tax measures, obligations, and rights that are imposed under the WTO Agreement, and tax measures under conventions regarding avoidance of double taxation. As such the numerous double taxation conventions that Indonesia has signed with other countries will not be affected by the Agreement. Additionally, regulations regarding government procurement of goods and services are also exempt from the application of the Agreement, with the condition that such procurement is exclusively for government purposes, and not with a view to commercial resale. Finally, since many have feared that the implementation of investment cooperation between ASEAN and China would hurt a number of Indonesian industries due to their inability to effectively compete due to financial limitations, technology and other reasons, Article 3 (4) (c) states that subsidies and grants that are offered exclusively to Indonesian investors, such as those in the agriculture industry, would still be allowed.

 

National Treatment and the Most Favored Nation Clause

As set out under Articles 4 and 5 on National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN), these two cornerstone principles of trade law are incorporated into the Agreement. Under these principles, parties to the Agreement are to treat other parties’ investments in their territory no less favorably than those of domestic investors or of any other party or third country. The obligations apply to treatment with respect to admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, maintenance, use, liquidation, sale, and other forms of disposal of investments. However, under Articles 4 (2) and (3) certain exceptions to the most favored nation clause are set out, carving out certain future (but allowing for an equal opportunity to negotiate equivalent) and existing agreements that provide preferential treatment.

An example of the type of abuse that the Most Favored Nation clause is designed to prevent is the case of the Indonesian National Car Program which began in 1996 with the Timor car brand that was merely a rebranding of South Korean manufactured KIAs. The effect was that the rebranded cars from South Korea benefited from not being subject to the same import duties as those from other countries. As a result Japan filed a complaint against Indonesia with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Following which it was found that such preferential treatment was in violation of the TRIMs Agreement and the 1994 GATT. With regard to the case, many observers argued that the National Car Program lacked the component of local parts, and the local participation in manufacturing of the car involved less than 30 Indonesian workers for thousands of cars that were produced. It was found that the car production was done entirely in South Korea with a completely build-up car being imported into Indonesia.

National Treatment and Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment philosophy is that of non-discrimination, nonetheless exemptions are made for preferential treatment made by parties to the Agreement for investments by third parties under bilateral, regional or international agreements. An example being the cooperation agreements between ASEAN nations, ASEAN and Korea and Japan, and an ASEAN member with countries outside ASEAN.

 

Treatment of Investments

Legal

Pursuant to Article 7, each party must ensure that investments of another party receive fair and equitable treatment and are not denied justice in any legal or administrative proceedings. This is a notable aspect of the Agreement since foreign investment has received differential treatment in Indonesia on a number of occasions, such as in Pertamina v. Karaha Bodas Company (KBC).

The case of Pertamina v. KBC was a dispute over a geothermal power project in Garut, West Java, in which Pertamina had breached its contract, leading KBC to pursue arbitration in Geneva, Switzerland, which resulted in a ruling that Pertamina had to pay 260 million US Dollars to KBC. However, the Central Jakarta District Court refused to enforce the Swiss arbitral award, even though Indonesia had ratified the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).

Expropriation of a party investment pursuant to Article 8 is possible, but such expropriation, or acts similar to expropriation, are restricted to acts done for a public purpose, in accordance with the prevailing legal procedures, and carried out in a non-discriminatory manner. Any expropriation action has to compensate the investor with the fair market value, determined at the time of expropriation, paid within a reasonable time, with any delays being subject to interest.

Since such acts of expropriation can be construed as a private international law issue, the principle of lex rei sitae is reemphasized under Article 8 (4) in relation to land. This is particularly relevant to Indonesia, where zoning changes occur on a regular basis, and may well affect an investor’s immovable assets that are located in an area that is rezoned. Also, as provided under Article 8 (6), certain expropriation of intangible investment in the form of intellectual property rights is exempted from the application of the Agreement’s provisions on expropriation.

 

Security

Many investors are concerned about security issues when considering investments in other countries, especially if the destination of the investment is a developing country. As such, uncertainty over the return of investment hinders investment flows to a number of countries, which is the case for many ASEAN members. Over the decade since the end of the Soeharto presidency, Indonesia has faced major security issues which shook the confidence of foreign investors in Indonesia and the flow of investment to Indonesia, with instances of riots, terrorism, and demonstrations on an unprecedented scale.

Regarding security issues, parties are obliged to give full protection and security assurance to other parties’ investments from any security threats that might disturb the investment. In the event that a party’s failure to secure another party’ investment results in a loss, under Article 9, the host country is obliged to provide restitution, indemnification, compensation, or another form of settlement. Although potentially appearing excessive, such provisions are in fact considered to be necessary since the success of an economy depends of the political and security stability, which in turn attracts investment.

 

Transfers and Repatriation of Profits

The free movement of capital to and from a country is common in the global economy, nonetheless in newly emerging economies, most governments want foreign investment to remain and circulate within their territory. This is often achieved by preventing and delaying capital transfers through the issuance of restrictive legislation. However, such measures to prohibit transfers of capital and the repatriation of profits from a jurisdiction are typically seen to hinder foreign investment. As a result Article 10 allows for the mostly-unrestricted movement of capital.

Under Article 10 (3) parties are given the right to prevent or delay transfers through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of their laws in the event of: bankruptcy; non-fulfillment of transfer requirements relating to securities, futures, options or derivates; non-fulfillment of tax obligations; criminal offences which require the recovery of the proceeds of crime; social security, public retirement or compulsory saving schemes; compliance with judgments in judicial or administrative proceedings; worker retrenchment benefits; and financial reporting which relates to law enforcement or financial regulatory authorities. Such restrictions on the movement of capital are typically seen as being reasonable since they are designed to prevent foreign investors from fleeing a country while leaving unsettled obligations that the local government is left to resolve.

 

Financial Safeguards

Significant economic turmoil had occurred during the past decade, including such events as the Asian monetary crisis in 1997 and the recent American and European financial crisis. As a result, under Article 11, parties are given the right to pursue financial measures to protect their monetary security. Additionally, under Article 10 (5) (c), parties are allowed to prevent or delay capital transfers if such capital movements would cause, or threaten to cause, serious economic or financial disturbance to the party.

 

Subrogation

Under Article 12 parties are given the right to step into the shoes of their investors when pursuing indemnity from other parties to the Agreement for reasons such as expropriation, as set out in Article 8, and compensation for losses caused by security issues such as wars, conflicts, state emergencies, revolts, insurrections or riots within the territory of the other party, as set out in Article 9.

The parties are deemed to acknowledge the subrogation from a party’s investor to an entity that can take the form of an agency, institution, statutory body or corporation designated for the purpose of the subrogation. It should be noted that claims brought to a party by subrogation are not entitled to receive an indemnity of more than the amount of the actual damages/losses. This is an indication that the influence of the civil law legal system prevails over that of the common law legal system, since punitive damages will not be awarded, making it impossible to recover beyond the amount of the actual loss.

 

Dispute Settlement

The Agreement regulates disputes of two types, the first one being disputes between parties, as addressed in Article 13, and the latter one being disputes between a party and an investor from another party, as addressed in Article 14. In resolving disputes between parties, the procedure does not refer to the Agreement, instead directing the parties to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism Framework Agreement that was signed in 2004 in Vientiane, Laos.

Disputes between a party and an investor from another party, under Article 14, can stem from the breach of obligations with regards to National Treatment (Article 4), Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Article 5), Fair and Equitable Treatment (Article 7), Expropriation (Article 8), Compensation for Losses (Article 9), and Transfers and Repatriation of Profits (Article 10), which cause loss or damage to the investor in relation to its investment with respect to the management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition of an investment.

The application of Article 14 does not apply retroactively, as its applicability is limited to investment disputes arising out of events that occurred following the entry into force of the Agreement.

A timeline to resolve investment dispute is given, under which all disputes must undergo a consultation phase. And if, within a 6 months period from a written request for consultation, the dispute has not been resolved the claimant has a choice of venue to pursue the dispute.

The venue can be in the form of an administrative tribunal of the disputing party or any administrative tribunal that has jurisdiction. An example of the latter option would be the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), using the ICSID dispute procedural law. Or the use of arbitration under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, or, if the disputing parties agree, almost any other arbitration institution using its own arbitration rules.

In the event that an investment dispute case has already been submitted to a competent domestic court, the claimant (investor) may instead submit its claim for international dispute settlement, with the requirement that before withdrawing the claim the case has not reached a final judgment. However, in the event that a dispute is initially submitted to a domestic court in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, or Vietnam, the choice of the corresponding procedural law becomes final, as per Article 14 (5).

Diplomatic protection of a disputing investor or bringing an international claim are prohibited under Article 14 (8), unless the losing party fails to abide by, and comply with, an award rendered in a dispute.

In regards to a dispute claim by an investor over a party breaching Article 8 regarding expropriation via an adoption or enforcement of a taxation measure, the party of the investor and the host party have to, upon the request of the host party, hold a consultation to determine whether the taxation measure in question has an effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalization. If within 180 days from the submission of a written request for consultation the dispute is not resolved, the disputing investor may bring its claim to arbitration.

 

Denial of Benefits

Article 15 is an anti-abuse mechanism. Designed to prevent non-party investors from trying to benefit from the Agreement, while having no real business connection in a party’s territory, by establishing a dummy corporation in a party’s jurisdiction for the purpose of benefiting from the Agreement in the territory of another party (Article 15 (1) (a)). Another ground to deny benefits is where domestic investors attempt to benefit from the Agreement by means of a similarly-designed scheme (Article 15 (1) (b)).

 

Exceptions

Under Article 16, without taking actions that might constitute or lead to unjustifiable discrimination against another party’s investors, the parties may enforce measures necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order, protect human, animal or plant life or health, or secure compliance with laws that are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement. As stated in Article 17, parties are also not to construe the Agreement in a way that might prevent them from addressing certain enumerated security issues.

 

Other Aspects

Transparency

A common issue in developing countries is that of transparency of the prevailing laws and regulations, consequently, Article 19 requires parties to make all relevant laws, regulations, policies and administrative guidelines of general application that pertain to, or affect investments in its territory publically available. And notify, at least annually, the other parties of such legislative developments. Additionally a mechanism has to be established to direct investors to where they may obtain such information.

However, not all information is to be provided to other parties, as an exception is carved out for information that would impede law enforcement, or the release of which would be contrary to the public interest.

 

Promotion and Facilitation

The comprehensive economic cooperation is to be promoted by the parties, under Article 20, by means of the parties organizing business events to raise awareness of ASEAN-China as an investment area. The parties are also obliged to facilitate investment by means of creating the necessary environment for all forms of investment; simplifying procedures for investment applications and approvals; promoting dissemination of investment information, including investment rules, regulations, policies and procedures; and establishing a one-stop investment centre in the respective host parties to provide assistance and advisory services, including the facilitation of operating licenses and permits.

 

Institution

In ensuring the implementation of the Agreement, the ASEAN Secretariat is placed in charge of monitoring and reporting the performance duties of each of the parties to the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials Meetings and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China.

 

Conclusion

The Agreement aims to facilitate the flow of Investment amongst the parties, while ensuring that investment will go side by side with the trade in goods and services, which is the aim of the comprehensive economic cooperation between ASEAN and China. In ensuring the implementation of the Agreement, parties create security and legal certainty, setting out tasks for all parties to implement the necessary legislation and to uphold the laws, which in turn should promote and protect investment within their territory.

While not every provision applies to all of the parties, due to the country specific exceptions that exist throughout the Agreement, the Agreement creates a reasonably uniform and beneficial for investment legal framework that is now being implemented within each party’s domestic law.

......

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