Indonesia's Recent Move Towards Transparency and Oversight in Extractive Industries
Overview
Having been drafted for two years, the government recently (23/4) released Presidential Regulation No. 26 of 2010 (“2010 Regulation”), making its first substantive move to increase transparency in the operations of extractive industries by mandating the disclosure of state revenues obtained from oil, gas, coal, and mineral mining activities. The Regulation calls for the establishment of an ‘Extractive Industry Transparency Team’ (“Team”), which will publicize extractive industry revenue-related information.
For the most part, both the Team and its parental Regulation have been regarded positively, but critiques abound that internal matters around the Team organization and ambiguity at points in the Regulation may create issues for enforcement.
This Indonesian Law Digest’s inquiry first asks why increased transparency in the extractive industries was necessitated, then moves on to assess whether the government’s efforts to date - now chiefly including the 2010 Regulation - are sufficient to bring about the ‘openness’ that is required of those industries.
Why Transparency is Needed in the National Extractive Industry?
“Information is power”: this old adage is particularly suited to transparency in the extractive industries, where ‘irregularities’ in financial reporting and state revenues lead to substantial losses to public. If empowered with information, the public can provide additional oversight over extractive industry operations.
Lacking access to information and insufficient transparency provides ripe conditions for the emergence of the ‘triple threats’ of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Ridaya Laodengkowe of ‘Publish What You Pay’ Indonesia, a coalition of NGOs supporting transparency in extractive resource management, asserted that indeed, every time firms go to pay their obligations to the state, “revenues tend to disappear” (Jakarta Post (26/5).
On the basis of a Supreme Audit Agency audit from years 2000 to 2008, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) posits that ‘irregularities’ have resulted in a loss to the state of some IDR 345.96 trillion - an average IDR 38.4 trillion annually. The ICW attributes this to corruption, symptomatic of the lacking transparency and oversight in extractive industry revenue management.
Given that extractive industries contribute nearly 35% of Indonesian state revenues, rectifying the problem of transparency is certainly in the interest of the public. The private sector also benefits, as reduced corruption and increased transparency are both cornerstones of an attractive investment climate. Mr. Laodengkowe cited a study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers indicating that the reluctance of many oil, gas, and mining companies to invest in Indonesia stems largely from anxieties about the opaque revenue system.
Global Efforts to Promote Extractive Industry Transparency
Efforts to promote transparency in the extractive industries came together in 2002 with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), spearheaded largely by British Prime Minister - at that time - Tony Blair. It essentially serves as a global standard to promote revenue transparency and access to revenue information in resource extraction sectors.
The tendency of resource-rich countries to suffer from the ‘resource curse’ has caused numerous states to join in the Initiative. EITI advocates argue that with effective governance and transparency, resource-rich countries can better manage the exploitation of their resources and generate larger revenues to foster economic growth, serve the public, and reduce poverty.
In 2003, at a conference in London, the British government convened a group of resource-rich countries, civil society organizations, and extractive firms, concluding upon a set of ‘EITI Principles’ that have become the backbone of the initiative.
Two years later, in 2005, agreement was reached upon another instrument, the ‘EITI Criteria,’ which include 6 criteria to guide countries in their implementation of transparency in the extractive industries. They include, among other things, (1) ‘openness’ of all documents relating to extractive companies’ payment of, and revenues received by the government, (2) audit of the aforementioned documents, (3) reconciliation between the documents (i.e., whether the company payment and state revenue documents correspond) by a credible, independent organization, and (4) public participation in the transparency and oversight process.
The instruments are voluntary in nature, so the EITI Principles and Criteria are applied upon consent of the state. The EITI Fact Sheet from May 2010 shows two countries who have the status of ‘EITI Compliant Countries’: Azerbaijan and Liberia. Meanwhile, there are 29 ‘EITI Candidate Countries’ (i.e., those that have signed the agreement but not yet completed the transition process), including: Afghanistan, Albania, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mauritania, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Yemen, and Zambia.
Extractive Industries Transparency in Indonesia
Although Indonesia is yet to actually sign the Initiative, the recently-resigned Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati indicated as early as 2008 that it was more or less certain that Indonesia would do so in the near future. That incidentally corresponds to Presidential Instruction No. 5 of 2008 on the 2008 - 2009 Focused Economic Programs: in the Attachment to that Instruction, the President ordered the ministers of Finance, and Energy and Mineral Resources to improve management and transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors.
One year later, and with additional support from the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, a Memorandum of Understanding (No. MOU-01/M.Ekon/01/2009) was issued, setting out a plan to establish a team to supervise the implementation of transparency of state revenues in the extractive industries. In short, it provided the initial impetus for the Extractive Industry Transparency Team.
The Extractive Industry Transparency Team
The Team established under the 2010 Regulation is arguably the first concrete action to implement transparency in the natural resource sectors. Its composition includes the ‘Steering Team’ and ‘Implementing Team’; each consists of various stakeholders, NGOs, extractive industry representatives, and central and regional government representatives.
See also: ILB No. 1406 3/5/2010.
As set out in Article 3 of the 2010 Regulation, the Team is assigned to implement transparency of state and regional revenues from oil, gas, mineral, and coal industries. To that extent, the Team is authorized to collect information and data from central and regional governments, extractive companies, and any other parties deemed necessary to the Team’s work.
The Team will require and disseminate reports from the government, Upstream Oil and Gas Supervisory Agency (BP Migas), and extractive companies. The obligatory reports will use a specific template that the Team will formulate.
Article 14 (2) of the 2010 Regulation goes into greater detail about the reports; not all parties submit the same information or go through the same procedures. The central government and BP Migas must provide financial reports after they are reviewed by the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (‘BPKP’). Regional governments must similarly provide BPKP-reviewed regional financial reports. Finally, extractive companies must provide the companies financial reports after being audited by an independent auditor.
The Team will later ‘reconcile’ the abovementioned reports. Reconciliation, in accounting terminology, refers to the process of comparing two or more sets of records to ensure that they are in harmony. Having done this, the Team must publicize all results to the public.
Issues Surrounding the Team and the 2010 Regulation
The 2010 Regulation and the Team itself may not be ready to take immediate action.
The Implementing Team, for example, currently has no members, although Article 18 of the 2010 Regulation allows the government until 23 July 2010 to appoint them. Meanwhile, the reporting template to be used for disclosure of financial information (i.e., transparency) has not been formulated - the entity mandated to do so is the yet-inexistent Implementing Team.
Even once the Implementing Team is established, the Regulation may not be implemented to its fullest extent, at least initially. Muhammad Husen, Deputy Assistant III on Oil at the Coordinating Ministry for the Economy, told hukumonline (6/5) that for the first year, the Team will not work throughout the country, but rather only in prioritized areas with numerous extractive activities; Riau, East Kalimantan, and parts of Sumatera.
Indeed, across Indonesia there are over 8,000 Mining Concessions (‘KP’), 150 Work Contracts (‘KK’), and 130 Coal Mining Exploitation Working Arrangements (‘PKP2B’). Reviewing and reconciling all of the associated financial documentation will be a significant task for the Team, and not nearly all information will be made available to the public right away. At best, transparency will likely come in modest stages.
At the regulatory level, the soft language of Article 14 (1) of the 2010 Regulation, which critically addresses the handover of documents from requested parties to the Team, has given cause for skepticism as to whether documentation will ever be provided to the Team at all. Mr. Laodengkowe told hukumonline (3/5) that the provision may provide reluctant parties with a legal loophole to avoid submitting required documents.
Conclusion
Extractive industries in Indonesia have historically operated under a regime characterized by a cozy oversight relationship with the government where transparency does not exist. In light of recent efforts, the question is whether that arrangement will continue to give rise to ‘irregularities’ in state revenues and reporting practices.
Although there may well be reason for optimism with the new Extractive Industry Transparency Team, it remains incomplete and is not yet operational. Whether it ever becomes operational is still a valid question, due to soft wording in the 2010 Regulation around information submission requirements, among other things.
Even then, the transparency effort as a whole is entirely dependent upon the Team’s publication of information; outside of that one channel, nothing exists in regulation to oblige extractive companies to simply publicize their revenue-related information to the wider public. Meanwhile, despite considerable headway being made, Indonesia still has not officially attached itself to the global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, raising questions about the level of commitment.
Nonetheless, developments thus far with the 2010 Regulation and the Team itself bode well for increased oversight in the future, however gradual it may be to develop. Given Indonesia’s significant natural resource endowment, the potential gains in revenue and from a cleaner business environment could be substantial.
Having been drafted for two years, the government recently (23/4) released Presidential Regulation No. 26 of 2010 (“2010 Regulation”), making its first substantive move to increase transparency in the operations of extractive industries by mandating the disclosure of state revenues obtained from oil, gas, coal, and mineral mining activities. The Regulation calls for the establishment of an ‘Extractive Industry Transparency Team’ (“Team”), which will publicize extractive industry revenue-related information.
For the most part, both the Team and its parental Regulation have been regarded positively, but critiques abound that internal matters around the Team organization and ambiguity at points in the Regulation may create issues for enforcement.
This Indonesian Law Digest’s inquiry first asks why increased transparency in the extractive industries was necessitated, then moves on to assess whether the government’s efforts to date - now chiefly including the 2010 Regulation - are sufficient to bring about the ‘openness’ that is required of those industries.
Why Transparency is Needed in the National Extractive Industry?
“Information is power”: this old adage is particularly suited to transparency in the extractive industries, where ‘irregularities’ in financial reporting and state revenues lead to substantial losses to public. If empowered with information, the public can provide additional oversight over extractive industry operations.
Lacking access to information and insufficient transparency provides ripe conditions for the emergence of the ‘triple threats’ of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Ridaya Laodengkowe of ‘Publish What You Pay’ Indonesia, a coalition of NGOs supporting transparency in extractive resource management, asserted that indeed, every time firms go to pay their obligations to the state, “revenues tend to disappear” (Jakarta Post (26/5).
On the basis of a Supreme Audit Agency audit from years 2000 to 2008, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) posits that ‘irregularities’ have resulted in a loss to the state of some IDR 345.96 trillion - an average IDR 38.4 trillion annually. The ICW attributes this to corruption, symptomatic of the lacking transparency and oversight in extractive industry revenue management.
Given that extractive industries contribute nearly 35% of Indonesian state revenues, rectifying the problem of transparency is certainly in the interest of the public. The private sector also benefits, as reduced corruption and increased transparency are both cornerstones of an attractive investment climate. Mr. Laodengkowe cited a study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers indicating that the reluctance of many oil, gas, and mining companies to invest in Indonesia stems largely from anxieties about the opaque revenue system.
Global Efforts to Promote Extractive Industry Transparency
Efforts to promote transparency in the extractive industries came together in 2002 with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), spearheaded largely by British Prime Minister - at that time - Tony Blair. It essentially serves as a global standard to promote revenue transparency and access to revenue information in resource extraction sectors.
The tendency of resource-rich countries to suffer from the ‘resource curse’ has caused numerous states to join in the Initiative. EITI advocates argue that with effective governance and transparency, resource-rich countries can better manage the exploitation of their resources and generate larger revenues to foster economic growth, serve the public, and reduce poverty.
In 2003, at a conference in London, the British government convened a group of resource-rich countries, civil society organizations, and extractive firms, concluding upon a set of ‘EITI Principles’ that have become the backbone of the initiative.
Two years later, in 2005, agreement was reached upon another instrument, the ‘EITI Criteria,’ which include 6 criteria to guide countries in their implementation of transparency in the extractive industries. They include, among other things, (1) ‘openness’ of all documents relating to extractive companies’ payment of, and revenues received by the government, (2) audit of the aforementioned documents, (3) reconciliation between the documents (i.e., whether the company payment and state revenue documents correspond) by a credible, independent organization, and (4) public participation in the transparency and oversight process.
The instruments are voluntary in nature, so the EITI Principles and Criteria are applied upon consent of the state. The EITI Fact Sheet from May 2010 shows two countries who have the status of ‘EITI Compliant Countries’: Azerbaijan and Liberia. Meanwhile, there are 29 ‘EITI Candidate Countries’ (i.e., those that have signed the agreement but not yet completed the transition process), including: Afghanistan, Albania, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mauritania, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Yemen, and Zambia.
Extractive Industries Transparency in Indonesia
Although Indonesia is yet to actually sign the Initiative, the recently-resigned Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati indicated as early as 2008 that it was more or less certain that Indonesia would do so in the near future. That incidentally corresponds to Presidential Instruction No. 5 of 2008 on the 2008 - 2009 Focused Economic Programs: in the Attachment to that Instruction, the President ordered the ministers of Finance, and Energy and Mineral Resources to improve management and transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors.
One year later, and with additional support from the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, a Memorandum of Understanding (No. MOU-01/M.Ekon/01/2009) was issued, setting out a plan to establish a team to supervise the implementation of transparency of state revenues in the extractive industries. In short, it provided the initial impetus for the Extractive Industry Transparency Team.
The Extractive Industry Transparency Team
The Team established under the 2010 Regulation is arguably the first concrete action to implement transparency in the natural resource sectors. Its composition includes the ‘Steering Team’ and ‘Implementing Team’; each consists of various stakeholders, NGOs, extractive industry representatives, and central and regional government representatives.
See also: ILB No. 1406 3/5/2010.
As set out in Article 3 of the 2010 Regulation, the Team is assigned to implement transparency of state and regional revenues from oil, gas, mineral, and coal industries. To that extent, the Team is authorized to collect information and data from central and regional governments, extractive companies, and any other parties deemed necessary to the Team’s work.
The Team will require and disseminate reports from the government, Upstream Oil and Gas Supervisory Agency (BP Migas), and extractive companies. The obligatory reports will use a specific template that the Team will formulate.
Article 14 (2) of the 2010 Regulation goes into greater detail about the reports; not all parties submit the same information or go through the same procedures. The central government and BP Migas must provide financial reports after they are reviewed by the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (‘BPKP’). Regional governments must similarly provide BPKP-reviewed regional financial reports. Finally, extractive companies must provide the companies financial reports after being audited by an independent auditor.
The Team will later ‘reconcile’ the abovementioned reports. Reconciliation, in accounting terminology, refers to the process of comparing two or more sets of records to ensure that they are in harmony. Having done this, the Team must publicize all results to the public.
Issues Surrounding the Team and the 2010 Regulation
The 2010 Regulation and the Team itself may not be ready to take immediate action.
The Implementing Team, for example, currently has no members, although Article 18 of the 2010 Regulation allows the government until 23 July 2010 to appoint them. Meanwhile, the reporting template to be used for disclosure of financial information (i.e., transparency) has not been formulated - the entity mandated to do so is the yet-inexistent Implementing Team.
Even once the Implementing Team is established, the Regulation may not be implemented to its fullest extent, at least initially. Muhammad Husen, Deputy Assistant III on Oil at the Coordinating Ministry for the Economy, told hukumonline (6/5) that for the first year, the Team will not work throughout the country, but rather only in prioritized areas with numerous extractive activities; Riau, East Kalimantan, and parts of Sumatera.
Indeed, across Indonesia there are over 8,000 Mining Concessions (‘KP’), 150 Work Contracts (‘KK’), and 130 Coal Mining Exploitation Working Arrangements (‘PKP2B’). Reviewing and reconciling all of the associated financial documentation will be a significant task for the Team, and not nearly all information will be made available to the public right away. At best, transparency will likely come in modest stages.
At the regulatory level, the soft language of Article 14 (1) of the 2010 Regulation, which critically addresses the handover of documents from requested parties to the Team, has given cause for skepticism as to whether documentation will ever be provided to the Team at all. Mr. Laodengkowe told hukumonline (3/5) that the provision may provide reluctant parties with a legal loophole to avoid submitting required documents.
Conclusion
Extractive industries in Indonesia have historically operated under a regime characterized by a cozy oversight relationship with the government where transparency does not exist. In light of recent efforts, the question is whether that arrangement will continue to give rise to ‘irregularities’ in state revenues and reporting practices.
Although there may well be reason for optimism with the new Extractive Industry Transparency Team, it remains incomplete and is not yet operational. Whether it ever becomes operational is still a valid question, due to soft wording in the 2010 Regulation around information submission requirements, among other things.
Even then, the transparency effort as a whole is entirely dependent upon the Team’s publication of information; outside of that one channel, nothing exists in regulation to oblige extractive companies to simply publicize their revenue-related information to the wider public. Meanwhile, despite considerable headway being made, Indonesia still has not officially attached itself to the global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, raising questions about the level of commitment.
Nonetheless, developments thus far with the 2010 Regulation and the Team itself bode well for increased oversight in the future, however gradual it may be to develop. Given Indonesia’s significant natural resource endowment, the potential gains in revenue and from a cleaner business environment could be substantial.