KPPU Guidelines to Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law: Defining 'Interlocking Directorate'
Overview
Although President Soeharto’s economic regime was in principle derived largely from Western, liberal market ideas, it is no small irony that the Indonesian economy under his tutelage came to take on a highly anti-competitive, monopolistic, and centrally-managed character; resistance to which became increasingly vocal from the 1980’s onwards. Shortly after his acrimonious departure, Law No. 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic and Unfair Business Practices - the ‘Anti-Monopoly Law’ - was released, vesting power in the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (‘KPPU’) to implement the regulatory struggle against ‘unhealthy’ market activities. Far-reaching but incomplete, the Law has been a ‘work in progress’ since its issuance: numerous articles have required KPPU Guidelines to clarify how the Law is to be interpreted, and thus translate the regulation into operational reality.
The tenth and latest interpretive Guideline - KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010 - relates to Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, regulating what is known as ‘interlocking directorate’ - when one individual simultaneously serves as the executive for two or more companies. According to Article 26 of the Law, a ‘Director’ or ‘Commissioner’ of a ‘company’ is barred from holding the same executive position (i.e., director or commissioner) of another company that is (a) in the same relevant market, (b) has a close connection or linkage to the type(s) of business involved, or (c) has the capacity to coordinate to unfairly control or monopolize a given market.
The definitions of ‘Director’ and ‘Commissioner,’ among other things, have been contested since the Law’s inception, and constituted an obstacle to its implementation. This inquiry will delve into KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010’s elaboration of Article 26, highlighting implications of the regulation and briefly discussing points of contention that have been raised.
For a brief overview of KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010, see ILB No. 1343 8/3/2010.
Purpose
The Guidelines will not only assist the KPPU to implement the Anti-Monopoly Law, but also provide a reference to business actors, some of which may well be ambivalent about their status as executives in multiple organizations. Specifically, the purposes are threefold: (1) to clarify the perception and understanding of ‘interlocking directorate’; (2) to avoid any misinterpretations, and; (3) to prevent any parties from suffering losses from regulatory vagueness, thus cultivating a standardized - and ostensibly ‘fair’ - business competition environment.
Broadening the Meaning of ‘Director’ and ‘Commissioner’
Neither Article 26 nor its Elucidation clearly defined the meaning of ‘Director’ or ‘Commissioner,’ instead referring to other regulation including Law No. 19 of 2003 on State-Owned Enterprises, Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 8/26/PBI/2006 on Community Credit Banks, and others. Ultimately a consistent definition remained elusive.
In the Guidelines provided by KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010, the definition is far-reaching, referring to not only executives of Limited Liability Companies - Perusahaan Terbatas (‘PT’) in Indonesia - but also to be understood as any ‘top-level’ or ‘authorized’ individual that has a policy decision-making capacity in a civil society organization, firm, state- or regionally-owned enterprise, or foundation.
Additionally, any executive vice president, vice president, senior vice president, or president director - whether or not they actually play an active role in decision or policy-making - is to be considered a ‘Director’ under Article 26.
The definition of ‘Commissioner’ is widened significantly by the Guidelines. Previously, Commissioners only formally existed in the legal sense for PTs (i.e., Limited Liability Companies). Considering that businesses take other forms, the KPPU Guidelines define the position as an individual from any form of business who serves a supervisory role, or whose function is ‘similar to that of a commissioner’ in the supervisory sense.
In essence, the Guidelines formalize the vagueness of the initially-provided definition in Article 26: “to hold a position as a Director or Commissioner in a company” is regulated as “to hold a position as a top-level manager or supervisory manager of a company of a company [of practically any form].”
Prohibiting the Interlocking Directorate
Though the phenomenon of ‘interlocking directorate’ is notoriously associated with negative outcomes for business competition and other illegal practices such as insider trading, it actually is not always the case that the practice violates the anti-trust framework or even threatens intrinsic ethical principles underlying the law. Closer examination of Article 26 reflects that consideration, stating that ‘interlocking directorate’ is prohibited when “it may cause a monopolistic or unfair business practice [emphasis added].” By using the word “may,” the regulation acknowledges that interlocking directorate is problematic only on a conditional or situational basis.
That much is asserted by competition law specialists Andi Fahmi Lubis, Ningrum Natasya Sirait, and other contributors in Hukum Persaingan Usaha: Antara Teks & Konteks, who note that “the essence of Article 26…does not prohibit the practice of interlocking directorate. An interlocking directorate is only prohibited when…causing monopolistic and unfair business practices.”
The question then, is what sorts of situations constitute a violation towards the Anti-Monopoly Law, or more generally have the potential to impede competition?
The most clear-cut cases of problematic interlocking directorate scenarios are when a Director simultaneously serves the same, or similar roles in two (or more) companies competing in a single market. In that situation, it is possible to strategically arrange production volumes, coordinate marketing procedures, fix prices, organize market sharing, and other methods broadly termed as ‘horizontal coordination’ to curb the capacities of other competitors in the market, or prevent new actors from entering the market.
Another scenario of problematic interlocking directorate occurs when a Director holds a position in two or more companies that do not directly engage in the same business functions, but do support each other in a vertically-integrated line: in other words, when companies performing different functions form a ‘cartel’. For example, when companies at intermediate-level production (e.g., making glass bottles) coordinate with companies producing consumer durable or non-durable goods (e.g., soda companies), which then coordinate with particular retailers (e.g., grocery stores) to exclusively control the market of a good from production to the point of sale. Although vertical integration is the hallmark of industrial efficiency and is by no means necessarily ‘unfair,’ an executive simultaneously serving in two or more of the related companies does create the potential for collusion and market exclusivity in various forms.
Case Law
The Guidelines go so far as to use diagrams and real case examples to clearly illustrate what is meant by problematic interlocking directorate under Article 26. One of the two case examples provided involves PT. Garuda, the airline company, whose Directors were simultaneously serving as Commissioners in an online ticketing service company, PT. Abacus (Case No. 1/KPPU/L/2003).
The relations between Garuda and Abacus started when Garuda, after concluding an exclusive agreement with Abacus, appointed Abacus as the one and only party to provide the ‘Computerized Reservation System’ (CRS) for Garuda. The KPPU alleged that the agreement was intended to create market exclusivity, was unscrupulous, and most importantly was caused by the two Garuda Directors serving as Commissioners in Abacus.
According to the KPPU - and as is articulated in the Guidelines - the agreement created a market barrier to other would-be CRS providers who could compete in providing the online service for Garuda. The KPPU’s final decision declared that interlocking directorate in that situation caused a violation towards Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, among other articles in that regulation.
The Extent of Application of the Definitions for ‘Director’ and ‘Commissioner’: Problematic?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, during the KPPU’s drafting process for Regulation No. 7 of 2010, the public consultation brought up serious controversy around the broad definitions of Director and Commissioner. Amongst the detractors, University Indonesia law professor Dr. Erman Radjagukguk was particularly vocal.
In an event organized by hukumonline last year (23/11), Dr. Radjagukguk argued that KPPU Guidelines are simply designed to elaborate provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law, rather than make new provisions. In the professor’s view, the Director and Commissioner positions are exclusive to PT entities, and extending their definitions beyond that is tantamount to introducing a new provision, which according to him is beyond the role of the regulation and the KPPU as an institution.
As mentioned previously, the regulation seems to have formalized a sweeping, if not vague definition as whoever simply “holds a position as a top-level manager or supervisor of a company.” On the other hand, it does serve as an official interpretive guideline; quite the coffee-house dilemma.
Sanctions
The Guidelines reinforce the sanctions available to the Anti-Monopoly Law by reminding that as with other articles of the regulation, violations towards Article 26 will be subject to administrative and quite possibly criminal sanctions.
Administrative sanctions are threefold, and could include any combination of: an order to refrain from further activities (e.g. to resign from one of the positions); to pay compensation, or; to pay a fine of up to IDR 25 billion. Meanwhile criminal sanctions range from a criminal fine up to IDR 25 billion, to imprisonment of up to 5 years.
EnforcementDate
KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010 has been in force since 6 January 2010.
Conclusion
Guidelines to interpreting Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law have been anticipated for some time. Not only will the clarification facilitate operational implementation of the Law in problematic cases of interlocking directorate, but it may also help to liberate the indwelling potential of the Anti-Monopoly Law as a truly meaningful legal instrument.
A critical feature of the regulation is the perhaps ‘vague’ definition of both Director and Commissioner positions, extending the terminology beyond the traditional associations with PT or Limited Liability Companies only. While the broad definition may cause many executive’s arrangements in different organizations to be defined as ‘interlocking directorate,’ the regulation does clarify and reinforce Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, reassuring that interlocking directorate is only prohibited in instances that violate the Law by threatening healthy, legal market activity.
Although President Soeharto’s economic regime was in principle derived largely from Western, liberal market ideas, it is no small irony that the Indonesian economy under his tutelage came to take on a highly anti-competitive, monopolistic, and centrally-managed character; resistance to which became increasingly vocal from the 1980’s onwards. Shortly after his acrimonious departure, Law No. 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic and Unfair Business Practices - the ‘Anti-Monopoly Law’ - was released, vesting power in the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (‘KPPU’) to implement the regulatory struggle against ‘unhealthy’ market activities. Far-reaching but incomplete, the Law has been a ‘work in progress’ since its issuance: numerous articles have required KPPU Guidelines to clarify how the Law is to be interpreted, and thus translate the regulation into operational reality.
The tenth and latest interpretive Guideline - KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010 - relates to Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, regulating what is known as ‘interlocking directorate’ - when one individual simultaneously serves as the executive for two or more companies. According to Article 26 of the Law, a ‘Director’ or ‘Commissioner’ of a ‘company’ is barred from holding the same executive position (i.e., director or commissioner) of another company that is (a) in the same relevant market, (b) has a close connection or linkage to the type(s) of business involved, or (c) has the capacity to coordinate to unfairly control or monopolize a given market.
The definitions of ‘Director’ and ‘Commissioner,’ among other things, have been contested since the Law’s inception, and constituted an obstacle to its implementation. This inquiry will delve into KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010’s elaboration of Article 26, highlighting implications of the regulation and briefly discussing points of contention that have been raised.
For a brief overview of KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010, see ILB No. 1343 8/3/2010.
Purpose
The Guidelines will not only assist the KPPU to implement the Anti-Monopoly Law, but also provide a reference to business actors, some of which may well be ambivalent about their status as executives in multiple organizations. Specifically, the purposes are threefold: (1) to clarify the perception and understanding of ‘interlocking directorate’; (2) to avoid any misinterpretations, and; (3) to prevent any parties from suffering losses from regulatory vagueness, thus cultivating a standardized - and ostensibly ‘fair’ - business competition environment.
Broadening the Meaning of ‘Director’ and ‘Commissioner’
Neither Article 26 nor its Elucidation clearly defined the meaning of ‘Director’ or ‘Commissioner,’ instead referring to other regulation including Law No. 19 of 2003 on State-Owned Enterprises, Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 8/26/PBI/2006 on Community Credit Banks, and others. Ultimately a consistent definition remained elusive.
In the Guidelines provided by KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010, the definition is far-reaching, referring to not only executives of Limited Liability Companies - Perusahaan Terbatas (‘PT’) in Indonesia - but also to be understood as any ‘top-level’ or ‘authorized’ individual that has a policy decision-making capacity in a civil society organization, firm, state- or regionally-owned enterprise, or foundation.
Additionally, any executive vice president, vice president, senior vice president, or president director - whether or not they actually play an active role in decision or policy-making - is to be considered a ‘Director’ under Article 26.
The definition of ‘Commissioner’ is widened significantly by the Guidelines. Previously, Commissioners only formally existed in the legal sense for PTs (i.e., Limited Liability Companies). Considering that businesses take other forms, the KPPU Guidelines define the position as an individual from any form of business who serves a supervisory role, or whose function is ‘similar to that of a commissioner’ in the supervisory sense.
In essence, the Guidelines formalize the vagueness of the initially-provided definition in Article 26: “to hold a position as a Director or Commissioner in a company” is regulated as “to hold a position as a top-level manager or supervisory manager of a company of a company [of practically any form].”
Prohibiting the Interlocking Directorate
Though the phenomenon of ‘interlocking directorate’ is notoriously associated with negative outcomes for business competition and other illegal practices such as insider trading, it actually is not always the case that the practice violates the anti-trust framework or even threatens intrinsic ethical principles underlying the law. Closer examination of Article 26 reflects that consideration, stating that ‘interlocking directorate’ is prohibited when “it may cause a monopolistic or unfair business practice [emphasis added].” By using the word “may,” the regulation acknowledges that interlocking directorate is problematic only on a conditional or situational basis.
That much is asserted by competition law specialists Andi Fahmi Lubis, Ningrum Natasya Sirait, and other contributors in Hukum Persaingan Usaha: Antara Teks & Konteks, who note that “the essence of Article 26…does not prohibit the practice of interlocking directorate. An interlocking directorate is only prohibited when…causing monopolistic and unfair business practices.”
The question then, is what sorts of situations constitute a violation towards the Anti-Monopoly Law, or more generally have the potential to impede competition?
The most clear-cut cases of problematic interlocking directorate scenarios are when a Director simultaneously serves the same, or similar roles in two (or more) companies competing in a single market. In that situation, it is possible to strategically arrange production volumes, coordinate marketing procedures, fix prices, organize market sharing, and other methods broadly termed as ‘horizontal coordination’ to curb the capacities of other competitors in the market, or prevent new actors from entering the market.
Another scenario of problematic interlocking directorate occurs when a Director holds a position in two or more companies that do not directly engage in the same business functions, but do support each other in a vertically-integrated line: in other words, when companies performing different functions form a ‘cartel’. For example, when companies at intermediate-level production (e.g., making glass bottles) coordinate with companies producing consumer durable or non-durable goods (e.g., soda companies), which then coordinate with particular retailers (e.g., grocery stores) to exclusively control the market of a good from production to the point of sale. Although vertical integration is the hallmark of industrial efficiency and is by no means necessarily ‘unfair,’ an executive simultaneously serving in two or more of the related companies does create the potential for collusion and market exclusivity in various forms.
Case Law
The Guidelines go so far as to use diagrams and real case examples to clearly illustrate what is meant by problematic interlocking directorate under Article 26. One of the two case examples provided involves PT. Garuda, the airline company, whose Directors were simultaneously serving as Commissioners in an online ticketing service company, PT. Abacus (Case No. 1/KPPU/L/2003).
The relations between Garuda and Abacus started when Garuda, after concluding an exclusive agreement with Abacus, appointed Abacus as the one and only party to provide the ‘Computerized Reservation System’ (CRS) for Garuda. The KPPU alleged that the agreement was intended to create market exclusivity, was unscrupulous, and most importantly was caused by the two Garuda Directors serving as Commissioners in Abacus.
According to the KPPU - and as is articulated in the Guidelines - the agreement created a market barrier to other would-be CRS providers who could compete in providing the online service for Garuda. The KPPU’s final decision declared that interlocking directorate in that situation caused a violation towards Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, among other articles in that regulation.
The Extent of Application of the Definitions for ‘Director’ and ‘Commissioner’: Problematic?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, during the KPPU’s drafting process for Regulation No. 7 of 2010, the public consultation brought up serious controversy around the broad definitions of Director and Commissioner. Amongst the detractors, University Indonesia law professor Dr. Erman Radjagukguk was particularly vocal.
In an event organized by hukumonline last year (23/11), Dr. Radjagukguk argued that KPPU Guidelines are simply designed to elaborate provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law, rather than make new provisions. In the professor’s view, the Director and Commissioner positions are exclusive to PT entities, and extending their definitions beyond that is tantamount to introducing a new provision, which according to him is beyond the role of the regulation and the KPPU as an institution.
As mentioned previously, the regulation seems to have formalized a sweeping, if not vague definition as whoever simply “holds a position as a top-level manager or supervisor of a company.” On the other hand, it does serve as an official interpretive guideline; quite the coffee-house dilemma.
Sanctions
The Guidelines reinforce the sanctions available to the Anti-Monopoly Law by reminding that as with other articles of the regulation, violations towards Article 26 will be subject to administrative and quite possibly criminal sanctions.
Administrative sanctions are threefold, and could include any combination of: an order to refrain from further activities (e.g. to resign from one of the positions); to pay compensation, or; to pay a fine of up to IDR 25 billion. Meanwhile criminal sanctions range from a criminal fine up to IDR 25 billion, to imprisonment of up to 5 years.
EnforcementDate
KPPU Regulation No. 7 of 2010 has been in force since 6 January 2010.
Conclusion
Guidelines to interpreting Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law have been anticipated for some time. Not only will the clarification facilitate operational implementation of the Law in problematic cases of interlocking directorate, but it may also help to liberate the indwelling potential of the Anti-Monopoly Law as a truly meaningful legal instrument.
A critical feature of the regulation is the perhaps ‘vague’ definition of both Director and Commissioner positions, extending the terminology beyond the traditional associations with PT or Limited Liability Companies only. While the broad definition may cause many executive’s arrangements in different organizations to be defined as ‘interlocking directorate,’ the regulation does clarify and reinforce Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, reassuring that interlocking directorate is only prohibited in instances that violate the Law by threatening healthy, legal market activity.