The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement: Indonesia's Dilemma

Overview

Self-described developing countries typically seek to succeed from one economic mode of operation to another; this may well be the reason Indonesia’s successive governments have warmly received the China-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), which began to take force on 1 January 2010. The ACFTA itself was prepared for years: the original ‘Framework Agreement’ was signed by the original 6 ASEAN nations (including Indonesia) and China on 5 November 2002, and was ratified into domestic law by Presidential Decree No. 48 of 2004 on Ratification of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between [ASEAN] and the People’s Republic of China.

The Framework Agreement only provided an umbrella for the formulation of subsequent implementing instruments, one of particular significance being the 2004 Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China - otherwise known as the ‘Trade in Goods’ or ‘TIG Agreement’.

The core elements of the ACFTA and its subcomponent Agreements are largely drawn from the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and other World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements.

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are principally defined by the removal of tariff barriers, which are used to protect domestic productive sectors by regulating the extent of price competition brought by foreign imports - in short. Non-tariff barriers and quantitative-restriction policies are also addressed in the ACFTA.

The ACFTA is set to unfold import tariffs on upwards of 90% goods produced inside the free trade area in 4 stages over the span of the next 10 years. For ASEAN nations, this means almost unbridled competition with Chinese goods by 2020. Since China and Indonesia have many overlapping industrial strengths, particularly in the realm of manufacturing, Indonesia is concerned about what the effects of that competition will be when its sensitive (i.e., inefficient) industries have to ‘face the music’.

By geographical size, the ACFTA is the largest free trade area in the world. By volume, it is third behind the European Economic Area and the North American FTA (NAFTA). The area encompasses some 1.8 billion people, has a collective GDP in the area of USD 2 trillion, and will encompass internal trade of around USD 1.2 trillion.


Purpose

Certainly the ACFTA promises one thing: a higher volume of trade between Indonesia, China, and other ASEAN states. China-ASEAN Trade has escalated from USD 39.5 Billion in 2000, to USD 59.6 Billion in 2003, to a startling USD 192.5 Billion in 2008. The ACFTA will allow Indonesia and ASEAN generally to increase its exports to China, which has an incredible appetite for resources.

Removal of tariff barriers means less restrictions on cheap(er) imported goods: once-protected Indonesian industries will be stimulated to compete with import prices by moving towards ‘economies of scale’ - efficiently achieving maximal outputs with minimal inputs - in order to minimize production costs and thus lower consumption prices; in short, this makes the goods internationally competitive.

When domestic producers cannot attain international competitiveness, multilateral FTAs force the emergence of niche markets and the development of comparative advantage-based trade relations. The Indonesian economy will have to make adjustments to find niches, and inexorably there will be winners and losers.

Indonesia may have felt it had less to gain from this agreement, as it has a large domestic market, and has relied on subsidies to protect certain sectors and forms of consumption. On the other hand, if it did not act positively to the ACFTA, a series of bilateral FTAs were threatening to economically isolate Indonesia from the region. Chinese penetration of the Indonesian market is also a difficult tide to turn, and Indonesia may be trying to address that trend on its own terms.

Indonesia has also sought to become more attractive to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), promoted by free trade areas. Preferential ‘rules of origin’ allow capital and goods to move freely between signatory countries, streamlining business in the region. An integrated regional regulatory framework could invite FDI to Indonesia -  not only from Europe and the United States, but also from South Korea and Japan.


Removing Tariff Barriers

Indonesia will, like other signatory states, implement the removal of tariff barriers in 4 stages: Track 1 from January 1st, 2010; Track 2 in 2012; sensitive industries in 2018; and highly sensitive industries in 2020. Import tariffs - if they do exist - are currently in the area of 5% on most goods. 

Indonesia actually started implementing some tariff reductions after ratifying the TIG Agreement in 2004. Of particular significance is Minister of Finance Regulation No. 235/PMK.001/2008 on the Implementation of Import Duty in the Framework of the ACFTA. The regulation’s Attachments specify what the precise tariff duty will be for all 8738 products subject to import tariffs from 2009 to 2012.

In congruence with the ACFTA, tariffs on most goods are set to 0%, with exceptions being sensitive and highly sensitive goods. Goods enjoying a reduced or tariff-free journey must still fulfill certain conditions, including:

-

Imported goods from ACFTA member-states must display a Certificate of Origin (Surat Keterangan Asal), known as ‘Form E’, signed by the relevant authorities from the exporting country;

-

Exporters must provide the Tariff Preference facility code and reference number of the Form E in the Customs Declaration, and;

-

The Customs Declaration has to be registered in the Customs Office at the Port of Entry.

Indonesia is seeking to delay the implementation of tariff reductions in eight industrial sectors on some 228 product-categories, including: steel, textiles, furniture, footwear, iron, petrochemicals, basic inorganic chemicals, machinery, and cosmetics. The intention is to shift 146 categories from Track 1 to Track 2, shift 60 categories from Track 1 to the ‘sensitive list’, and another 22 that had been cut in 2009 to the sensitive list. In turn, it proposes accelerating implementation on 153 other categories. These negotiations have only begun to take initial form.


Removing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and Quantitative Restrictions:

Article 8(1) of the TIG Agreement prohibits restrictions on the quantity of goods that a signatory country allows to be imported. Article 8(2) provides that “Parties shall identify [NTBs]…for elimination as soon as possible,” and that “The time frame for elimination of these NTBs shall be mutually agreed upon by all Parties.”

NTBs exert substantial effects upon trade, and include: intellectual property laws, anti-dumping measures, import bans, quotas, sanitary and phyto-sanitary rules, packaging and labeling conditions, restrictive licenses, quality standards, subsidies, and rules of origin. Taken together, they can define the character of an economy.

Future discussions around ACFTA implementation are bound to revolve around NTBs. Indonesia, for example, continues to insist upon quality standards for Chinese steel imports; whether the motive is to protect the sensitive domestic steel industry or simply protect consumers from shabby products, China may seek to confront this policy. Although Indonesia continues to be heavily dependent on subsidies - fertilizer, fuel, electricity, and telephone services, to name a few - China may take aim at those policies if they are deemed obstacles to international competition.


‘Emergency Action’ - Safeguard Measures

In such cases that an imported product endangers or threatens to cause disruption to a particular market in a member state, that state is entitled to restrict the product from being imported for an initial period of 3 years, and that may be extended up to 1 year after that if necessary. This is known as ‘safeguarding’ and is detailed in Article 9 of the TIG Agreement.

The precise conditions required for safeguarding are set out by Article 9(3), but essentially can be boiled down to:

“If…imports of any particular product from the other Parties increase in such quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions so as to cause or threaten…serious injury to the domestic industry…that produces like or directly competitive products.”

In itself the TIG Agreement does not regulate what steps could be included in ‘safeguard measures’ but refers instead to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, with the (dubious) exclusion of Articles 5, 9, 13, and 14 regarding ‘quantitative restrictions’. 

For now, Indonesia is armed with a domestic safeguard for at least some goods: Minister of Trade Regulation No. 56/M-DAG/PER/12/2008 on Certain Import Products. For certain categories of imported products - foods & beverages, footwear, electronics, and toys - the government (‘relevant authority’) can refuse to grant approval for goods to be imported at international ports by denying approval documents from being granted to importers by subsidiary governmental agencies. The Regulation expires on 31 December 2010 - giving some breathing room to implement tariffs on relevant product categories, and time to prepare.


Dispute Resolution Under the ACFTA

Dispute resolution under the ACFTA is regulated by the Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China (Dispute Resolution Agreement). However, states can find other arrangements for dispute settlement if that arrangement is deemed unsatisfactory by the disputing parties.

Disputes must either relate to the Framework Agreement or its Annexes, which include the TIG Agreement. The Dispute Resolution Agreement presents three sequential forms of dispute settlement: consultation, conciliation or mediation, and arbitration.

Consultation is the first forum for states to seek recourse. The disputing parties are urged to reach a ‘mutually satisfactory solution’ within the specific timeframe as set out in Article 4(3) of the Dispute Resolution Agreement.

Alternatively, parties can resort to conciliation and mediation (Article 5): parties agree to involve a third party (person or body) to assist in settling the dispute. Presumably, this can take place during the consultation process. 

Failing those initial efforts to resolve the dispute, member states must submit the case to a 3-member Arbitral Tribunal, which are detailed further in Articles 6 to 9 of the Dispute Resolution Agreement. As for the Tribunal’s composition, both parties identify one arbitrator and mutually agree upon a third. The party lodging the complaint must formally identify the reason of its request: the specific act that is disputed, and; the factual and legal basis (with reference to ACFTA provisions) of alleged violations supporting the complaint.

Article 12(1) of the Dispute Agreement mandates the complained-against party to inform the complaining party of how it intends to implement the recommendations and rulings of the Arbitral Tribunal. Article 12(2) however provides that if it is “impracticable” to immediately implement the recommendations, a “reasonable amount of time” is to be granted; hopefully the timeframe is articulated by the Tribunal - the regulation is dubiously vague.


Amendments to the ACFTA

Should issues arise due to dubious provisions, unforeseen consequences, and so on, the Framework Agreement and its Annexes contain amendment mechanisms to modify or remove problematic mandates of the ACFTA. Although each component agreement contains an amendment mechanism, the archetypal process is one of two steps: (1) all member States must ‘mutually agree’ on the amendment, and; (2) all member states must submit formal agreement with the amendment in an official document.


ACFTA Ratification by Presidential Decree

Given the significance of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) for Indonesia, there have been concerns around the fact that its implementation is merely regulated (and brought on Indonesia’s economy) by Presidential Decree.

Many have argued that the ratification of ACFTA should have been through the issuance of a law: not only are laws superior to Presidential Decree in the legal hierarchy, but they are also formulated in a more ‘democratic’ fashion, since they are passed through the House of Representatives (‘DPR’). The DPR ostensibly contains a plurality of viewpoints, scrutinizes policy from different perspectives, and calls upon greater representation to decide if an agreement protects Indonesian interests - the Decree is almost authoritarian in comparison.

The legal dilemma, however, stems from Article 10 of Law No. 24 of 2000 on International Agreements (International Agreement Law). Article 10 lists the types of international agreements that must be regulated by a law, including those relating to ‘politics’ and ‘sovereignty’ - both of which could arguably relate to the ACFTA. However, it is by no means explicit about international trade, investments, or the economy. Meanwhile, Article 11 of the International Agreement Law allows - but neither requires - other agreements to be regulated by Presidential Decree.

Insofar as it relates to efficiency, the Decree is certainly a more effective method to engage the international sphere, where things can happen quickly. However, the ACFTA - like other international agreements - requires a great deal of interaction with, and modification of Indonesian laws and regulations. That could be problematic if, due to the form of its ratification, it is theoretically subordinate to domestic Laws and Government Regulations.


The Impact For Indonesia - ‘Hope for the Best, Prepare for the Worst’

The prospective increase in volume of trade between China and ASEAN favors the former. ASEAN Secretariat simulations expect exports to China to increase by 48%, and China’s exports to ASEAN will increase by 55%. This would exacerbate an already existing trade deficit on ASEAN and Indonesia’s part.

ASEAN’s top exports to China include organic chemicals, plastics, fats and oils, rubber, a host of natural resources and raw materials, and machinery / electrical parts to be assembled into final consumer products: in short, intermediate goods for China’s finished exports to Third Countries. ASEAN imports from China largely consist of manufactured products, capital goods, and final consumer durable and non-durable goods.

Indonesia is no exception to that trend. Imports from China in 2008 were dominated by two things: finished electronics and machinery, and textiles - finished goods. Indonesia’s exports to China in the same year were dominated by mineral fuels, fats and oils, and raw materials - intermediate goods.

The night-day difference in trade relations between China and Indonesia disguises a considerable overlap in production, particularly in manufacturing and textiles. However, compared to China, many of Indonesia’s manufactures are not competitive; textiles, for example, accounted for 1.6% of exports to China in 2008.

As a developing country, Indonesia seeks to shift its mode of production from intermediates to production of consumer durables and non-durables, along with capital goods, for which value-added is highest. In order to do this, it must develop vertically-integrated economic sectors in those areas where Indonesia feels it can develop a comparative advantage; some companies producing intermediates, others producing the final goods.

East Asian states such as South Korea developed vertically-integrated industries by raising barriers against imports, supporting domestic industrial development with policies like subsidies and exchange rate manipulations, and - consequent to their industrial maturity - exposing those industries to international trade pressures. Can Indonesia take the opposite route to economic maturity through the ACFTA? This remains to be seen, but Indonesia’s preparations - socialization of stakeholders to the policy, most principally - for such extensive market liberalization have seemed lackluster to some.

As Professors Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron point out in The Political Economy of North American Free Trade, a chief motivation of Mexico’s engagement in the NAFTA was to increase its volume of trade with the United States. Like Indonesia, Mexico sought to develop a robust, differentiated economy. While it is true that the volume of trade increased dramatically, Mexico evidently failed to move out of an oil-gas, intermediate-focused, labor-centric mode of economic operation. Granted, other variables could explain Mexico’s poor outcomes (corruption and mismanagement, for example), but it may be worthwhile to explore the parallels if indeed they do exist.

On the other hand, China’s market comprises 1.3 billion consumers. As its socioeconomic development catches up to its meteoric economic ascension, its demand for all varieties of goods will only continue to grow; it is not predicted to experience a prolonged period of ‘slump’ as did Japan. If Indonesia does manage to consolidate niches, it will have a market with practically unlimited demand for those goods.

Investment will likely increase within the ACFTA’s integrated market. Regulation-related risks and other uncertainties will be reduced; this attracts investors. Investment allows a well-managed economy to develop vertical integration in niche sectors. When used to purchase capital goods, investment can be particularly effective in the development of economies of scale.


Conclusion

Looking to the future, it may be prudent to assume the outcome for Indonesia will be archetypal of any multilateral FTA: specialization along the lines of comparative advantages - this will define the economic adjustment. What exactly those comparative advantages may be is the critical question: will Indonesia develop differentiated, vertically-integrated niches, or will it become entrenched in intermediate modes of production? Only time and the quality of political direction will tell.

 

 

 

......

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Overview

Self-described developing countries typically seek to succeed from one economic mode of operation to another; this may well be the reason Indonesia’s successive governments have warmly received the China-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), which began to take force on 1 January 2010. The ACFTA itself was prepared for years: the original ‘Framework Agreement’ was signed by the original 6 ASEAN nations (including Indonesia) and China on 5 November 2002, and was ratified into domestic law by Presidential Decree No. 48 of 2004 on Ratification of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between [ASEAN] and the People’s Republic of China.

The Framework Agreement only provided an umbrella for the formulation of subsequent implementing instruments, one of particular significance being the 2004 Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China - otherwise known as the ‘Trade in Goods’ or ‘TIG Agreement’.

The core elements of the ACFTA and its subcomponent Agreements are largely drawn from the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and other World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements.

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are principally defined by the removal of tariff barriers, which are used to protect domestic productive sectors by regulating the extent of price competition brought by foreign imports - in short. Non-tariff barriers and quantitative-restriction policies are also addressed in the ACFTA.

The ACFTA is set to unfold import tariffs on upwards of 90% goods produced inside the free trade area in 4 stages over the span of the next 10 years. For ASEAN nations, this means almost unbridled competition with Chinese goods by 2020. Since China and Indonesia have many overlapping industrial strengths, particularly in the realm of manufacturing, Indonesia is concerned about what the effects of that competition will be when its sensitive (i.e., inefficient) industries have to ‘face the music’.

By geographical size, the ACFTA is the largest free trade area in the world. By volume, it is third behind the European Economic Area and the North American FTA (NAFTA). The area encompasses some 1.8 billion people, has a collective GDP in the area of USD 2 trillion, and will encompass internal trade of around USD 1.2 trillion.


Purpose

Certainly the ACFTA promises one thing: a higher volume of trade between Indonesia, China, and other ASEAN states. China-ASEAN Trade has escalated from USD 39.5 Billion in 2000, to USD 59.6 Billion in 2003, to a startling USD 192.5 Billion in 2008. The ACFTA will allow Indonesia and ASEAN generally to increase its exports to China, which has an incredible appetite for resources.

Removal of tariff barriers means less restrictions on cheap(er) imported goods: once-protected Indonesian industries will be stimulated to compete with import prices by moving towards ‘economies of scale’ - efficiently achieving maximal outputs with minimal inputs - in order to minimize production costs and thus lower consumption prices; in short, this makes the goods internationally competitive.

When domestic producers cannot attain international competitiveness, multilateral FTAs force the emergence of niche markets and the development of comparative advantage-based trade relations. The Indonesian economy will have to make adjustments to find niches, and inexorably there will be winners and losers.

Indonesia may have felt it had less to gain from this agreement, as it has a large domestic market, and has relied on subsidies to protect certain sectors and forms of consumption. On the other hand, if it did not act positively to the ACFTA, a series of bilateral FTAs were threatening to economically isolate Indonesia from the region. Chinese penetration of the Indonesian market is also a difficult tide to turn, and Indonesia may be trying to address that trend on its own terms.

Indonesia has also sought to become more attractive to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), promoted by free trade areas. Preferential ‘rules of origin’ allow capital and goods to move freely between signatory countries, streamlining business in the region. An integrated regional regulatory framework could invite FDI to Indonesia -  not only from Europe and the United States, but also from South Korea and Japan.


Removing Tariff Barriers

Indonesia will, like other signatory states, implement the removal of tariff barriers in 4 stages: Track 1 from January 1st, 2010; Track 2 in 2012; sensitive industries in 2018; and highly sensitive industries in 2020. Import tariffs - if they do exist - are currently in the area of 5% on most goods. 

Indonesia actually started implementing some tariff reductions after ratifying the TIG Agreement in 2004. Of particular significance is Minister of Finance Regulation No. 235/PMK.001/2008 on the Implementation of Import Duty in the Framework of the ACFTA. The regulation’s Attachments specify what the precise tariff duty will be for all 8738 products subject to import tariffs from 2009 to 2012.

In congruence with the ACFTA, tariffs on most goods are set to 0%, with exceptions being sensitive and highly sensitive goods. Goods enjoying a reduced or tariff-free journey must still fulfill certain conditions, including:

-

Imported goods from ACFTA member-states must display a Certificate of Origin (Surat Keterangan Asal), known as ‘Form E’, signed by the relevant authorities from the exporting country;

-

Exporters must provide the Tariff Preference facility code and reference number of the Form E in the Customs Declaration, and;

-

The Customs Declaration has to be registered in the Customs Office at the Port of Entry.

Indonesia is seeking to delay the implementation of tariff reductions in eight industrial sectors on some 228 product-categories, including: steel, textiles, furniture, footwear, iron, petrochemicals, basic inorganic chemicals, machinery, and cosmetics. The intention is to shift 146 categories from Track 1 to Track 2, shift 60 categories from Track 1 to the ‘sensitive list’, and another 22 that had been cut in 2009 to the sensitive list. In turn, it proposes accelerating implementation on 153 other categories. These negotiations have only begun to take initial form.


Removing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and Quantitative Restrictions:

Article 8(1) of the TIG Agreement prohibits restrictions on the quantity of goods that a signatory country allows to be imported. Article 8(2) provides that “Parties shall identify [NTBs]…for elimination as soon as possible,” and that “The time frame for elimination of these NTBs shall be mutually agreed upon by all Parties.”

NTBs exert substantial effects upon trade, and include: intellectual property laws, anti-dumping measures, import bans, quotas, sanitary and phyto-sanitary rules, packaging and labeling conditions, restrictive licenses, quality standards, subsidies, and rules of origin. Taken together, they can define the character of an economy.

Future discussions around ACFTA implementation are bound to revolve around NTBs. Indonesia, for example, continues to insist upon quality standards for Chinese steel imports; whether the motive is to protect the sensitive domestic steel industry or simply protect consumers from shabby products, China may seek to confront this policy. Although Indonesia continues to be heavily dependent on subsidies - fertilizer, fuel, electricity, and telephone services, to name a few - China may take aim at those policies if they are deemed obstacles to international competition.


‘Emergency Action’ - Safeguard Measures

In such cases that an imported product endangers or threatens to cause disruption to a particular market in a member state, that state is entitled to restrict the product from being imported for an initial period of 3 years, and that may be extended up to 1 year after that if necessary. This is known as ‘safeguarding’ and is detailed in Article 9 of the TIG Agreement.

The precise conditions required for safeguarding are set out by Article 9(3), but essentially can be boiled down to:

“If…imports of any particular product from the other Parties increase in such quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions so as to cause or threaten…serious injury to the domestic industry…that produces like or directly competitive products.”

In itself the TIG Agreement does not regulate what steps could be included in ‘safeguard measures’ but refers instead to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, with the (dubious) exclusion of Articles 5, 9, 13, and 14 regarding ‘quantitative restrictions’. 

For now, Indonesia is armed with a domestic safeguard for at least some goods: Minister of Trade Regulation No. 56/M-DAG/PER/12/2008 on Certain Import Products. For certain categories of imported products - foods & beverages, footwear, electronics, and toys - the government (‘relevant authority’) can refuse to grant approval for goods to be imported at international ports by denying approval documents from being granted to importers by subsidiary governmental agencies. The Regulation expires on 31 December 2010 - giving some breathing room to implement tariffs on relevant product categories, and time to prepare.


Dispute Resolution Under the ACFTA

Dispute resolution under the ACFTA is regulated by the Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China (Dispute Resolution Agreement). However, states can find other arrangements for dispute settlement if that arrangement is deemed unsatisfactory by the disputing parties.

Disputes must either relate to the Framework Agreement or its Annexes, which include the TIG Agreement. The Dispute Resolution Agreement presents three sequential forms of dispute settlement: consultation, conciliation or mediation, and arbitration.

Consultation is the first forum for states to seek recourse. The disputing parties are urged to reach a ‘mutually satisfactory solution’ within the specific timeframe as set out in Article 4(3) of the Dispute Resolution Agreement.

Alternatively, parties can resort to conciliation and mediation (Article 5): parties agree to involve a third party (person or body) to assist in settling the dispute. Presumably, this can take place during the consultation process. 

Failing those initial efforts to resolve the dispute, member states must submit the case to a 3-member Arbitral Tribunal, which are detailed further in Articles 6 to 9 of the Dispute Resolution Agreement. As for the Tribunal’s composition, both parties identify one arbitrator and mutually agree upon a third. The party lodging the complaint must formally identify the reason of its request: the specific act that is disputed, and; the factual and legal basis (with reference to ACFTA provisions) of alleged violations supporting the complaint.

Article 12(1) of the Dispute Agreement mandates the complained-against party to inform the complaining party of how it intends to implement the recommendations and rulings of the Arbitral Tribunal. Article 12(2) however provides that if it is “impracticable” to immediately implement the recommendations, a “reasonable amount of time” is to be granted; hopefully the timeframe is articulated by the Tribunal - the regulation is dubiously vague.


Amendments to the ACFTA

Should issues arise due to dubious provisions, unforeseen consequences, and so on, the Framework Agreement and its Annexes contain amendment mechanisms to modify or remove problematic mandates of the ACFTA. Although each component agreement contains an amendment mechanism, the archetypal process is one of two steps: (1) all member States must ‘mutually agree’ on the amendment, and; (2) all member states must submit formal agreement with the amendment in an official document.


ACFTA Ratification by Presidential Decree

Given the significance of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) for Indonesia, there have been concerns around the fact that its implementation is merely regulated (and brought on Indonesia’s economy) by Presidential Decree.

Many have argued that the ratification of ACFTA should have been through the issuance of a law: not only are laws superior to Presidential Decree in the legal hierarchy, but they are also formulated in a more ‘democratic’ fashion, since they are passed through the House of Representatives (‘DPR’). The DPR ostensibly contains a plurality of viewpoints, scrutinizes policy from different perspectives, and calls upon greater representation to decide if an agreement protects Indonesian interests - the Decree is almost authoritarian in comparison.

The legal dilemma, however, stems from Article 10 of Law No. 24 of 2000 on International Agreements (International Agreement Law). Article 10 lists the types of international agreements that must be regulated by a law, including those relating to ‘politics’ and ‘sovereignty’ - both of which could arguably relate to the ACFTA. However, it is by no means explicit about international trade, investments, or the economy. Meanwhile, Article 11 of the International Agreement Law allows - but neither requires - other agreements to be regulated by Presidential Decree.

Insofar as it relates to efficiency, the Decree is certainly a more effective method to engage the international sphere, where things can happen quickly. However, the ACFTA - like other international agreements - requires a great deal of interaction with, and modification of Indonesian laws and regulations. That could be problematic if, due to the form of its ratification, it is theoretically subordinate to domestic Laws and Government Regulations.


The Impact For Indonesia - ‘Hope for the Best, Prepare for the Worst’

The prospective increase in volume of trade between China and ASEAN favors the former. ASEAN Secretariat simulations expect exports to China to increase by 48%, and China’s exports to ASEAN will increase by 55%. This would exacerbate an already existing trade deficit on ASEAN and Indonesia’s part.

ASEAN’s top exports to China include organic chemicals, plastics, fats and oils, rubber, a host of natural resources and raw materials, and machinery / electrical parts to be assembled into final consumer products: in short, intermediate goods for China’s finished exports to Third Countries. ASEAN imports from China largely consist of manufactured products, capital goods, and final consumer durable and non-durable goods.

Indonesia is no exception to that trend. Imports from China in 2008 were dominated by two things: finished electronics and machinery, and textiles - finished goods. Indonesia’s exports to China in the same year were dominated by mineral fuels, fats and oils, and raw materials - intermediate goods.

The night-day difference in trade relations between China and Indonesia disguises a considerable overlap in production, particularly in manufacturing and textiles. However, compared to China, many of Indonesia’s manufactures are not competitive; textiles, for example, accounted for 1.6% of exports to China in 2008.

As a developing country, Indonesia seeks to shift its mode of production from intermediates to production of consumer durables and non-durables, along with capital goods, for which value-added is highest. In order to do this, it must develop vertically-integrated economic sectors in those areas where Indonesia feels it can develop a comparative advantage; some companies producing intermediates, others producing the final goods.

East Asian states such as South Korea developed vertically-integrated industries by raising barriers against imports, supporting domestic industrial development with policies like subsidies and exchange rate manipulations, and - consequent to their industrial maturity - exposing those industries to international trade pressures. Can Indonesia take the opposite route to economic maturity through the ACFTA? This remains to be seen, but Indonesia’s preparations - socialization of stakeholders to the policy, most principally - for such extensive market liberalization have seemed lackluster to some.

As Professors Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron point out in The Political Economy of North American Free Trade, a chief motivation of Mexico’s engagement in the NAFTA was to increase its volume of trade with the United States. Like Indonesia, Mexico sought to develop a robust, differentiated economy. While it is true that the volume of trade increased dramatically, Mexico evidently failed to move out of an oil-gas, intermediate-focused, labor-centric mode of economic operation. Granted, other variables could explain Mexico’s poor outcomes (corruption and mismanagement, for example), but it may be worthwhile to explore the parallels if indeed they do exist.

On the other hand, China’s market comprises 1.3 billion consumers. As its socioeconomic development catches up to its meteoric economic ascension, its demand for all varieties of goods will only continue to grow; it is not predicted to experience a prolonged period of ‘slump’ as did Japan. If Indonesia does manage to consolidate niches, it will have a market with practically unlimited demand for those goods.

Investment will likely increase within the ACFTA’s integrated market. Regulation-related risks and other uncertainties will be reduced; this attracts investors. Investment allows a well-managed economy to develop vertical integration in niche sectors. When used to purchase capital goods, investment can be particularly effective in the development of economies of scale.


Conclusion

Looking to the future, it may be prudent to assume the outcome for Indonesia will be archetypal of any multilateral FTA: specialization along the lines of comparative advantages - this will define the economic adjustment. What exactly those comparative advantages may be is the critical question: will Indonesia develop differentiated, vertically-integrated niches, or will it become entrenched in intermediate modes of production? Only time and the quality of political direction will tell.

 

 

 

......

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